ed by this individual level of high trust and the consequent construction of a strong civil society ought eventually to emerge as stable democracies. Inglehart elaborates further on this thesis by including a measure of support for revolutionary change. This variable is, in effect, the low or negative end of the system affect variable that was an important component of Almond and Verba's conception of civic culture.8 Inglehart adds to their notion of civic culture yet a third variable, life satisfaction.9 Those who are more satisfied with their lives are thought to be more likely to support democratic rule over the long run.
Inglehart finds that these three variables-interpersonal trust, support for revolutionary change, and life satisfaction-form a "broad syndrome of related attitudes... have you done for me lately?, it may be sustained by diffuse feelings that it is an inherently good thing. These feelings in turn may reflect economic and other successes that one experienced long ago or learned about second-hand as part of one's early socialization.14 More recently, Inglehart approvingly cites Axelrod's game theoretic work on cooperation, which suggests that social norms directly influence individual cooperative and noncooperative behavior.15 Social norms, then, may well interact with individual values. Inglehart's findings support that effect. Within most societies, more highly educated individuals have higher interpersonal trust than those with less education, and among the advanced industrial societies the gap in trust between low and high education widens considerably.16 I am unaware, however, of any political culture research that argues that individual attitudes are irrelevant or that they systematically produce behaviors regularly at variance with those attitudes. After all, it is individuals who vote, participate, and even rebel. While they do so in part based on national norms, their own values are presumed to matter directly for their own behavior. Hence, on the basis of Inglehart's finding of a link between trust and democracy, one would not predict for any country that people with lower levels of trust would be more supportive of democracy, while those with higher levels of trust would be less supportive, although it is possible to imagine conditions under which that reversal might occur. If that reversal were widespread, however, one would not expect to find macro-level associations linking high trust to democracy. In fact, one would normally predict a positive micro-association, even if a weak one, between trust and support for democracy, producing congruence between micro-and macro-level associations.
If half of the population of a nation expresses high interpersonal trust and the other half low interpersonal trust, to avoid the individualistic fallacy it is necessary to know whether the high trust half participates in civil society organizations more than the low trust half. If no test is made for that within-system relationship, the converse proposition, that those with low trust may participate in civil society organizations more than those with high trust, can not be excluded.17 In short, if political culture does not operate at the individual level eventually to produce democracy at the system level, by what mechanism could it be possibly operating? It is therefore vitally important to verify the macro-level findings with micro-level analysis whenever such data are available, as they are in the case of Inglehart's data sets. If the macro-level associations are not supported at the micro-level, the burden of the argument to explain these discrepancies falls directly on the shoulders of the researcher who is making the macro-level claims.
In the absence of micro-level analysis, researchers ought to wonder whether Inglehart's findings are an artifact of the individualistic fallacy. If they were, his data would conform to the pattern depicted by Przeworski and Teune, as shown in Belgium, Portugal, and Costa Rica). Empirical patterns such as these immediately suggest that the reported relationship of trust to democracy may be spurious. If countries can score either high or low on trust and still score high on democracy, trust may be a spurious predictor. In fact, when a single control variable, national per capita income measured in PPP terms for 1995, is introduced, interpersonal trust disappears as a significant predictor of democracy.29 Table 1 
Micro-Level Analysis
The preceding discussion leaves two questions. First, is there a micro-level civic culture syndrome relating trust, opposition to revolutionary change, and life satisfaction? Table 2 . The summary is necessary since, with twenty-two countries and three items each covering three time periods, there are nearly 200 individual correlates. The three items in the syndrome, again, are interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and opposition to revolutionary change. In 1976, the first year from which data were taken, only 53 percent of all the possible associations for the countries in the data set produced statistically significant correlations. By 1981-1983 this proportion dropped to 44 percent, and by 1986, the last year of data before Inglehart announced his discovery of the syndrome, it declined further to 31 percent. Thus, by 1986 over two-thirds of all the possible correlates of the three items that purportedly form the "enduring civic culture syndrome" were found to be insignificantly related. This decline in the weak relationships found in 1976 is not, of course, a function of newly established democracies "washing out" the relationship (as Inglehart claimed in his analysis at the macro level), since the countries in the data set did not change between 1976 and 1986. Even more troubling, in several countries with the longest democratic traditions Inglehart's data provide virtually no evidence for the existence of the syndrome. Of the nine possible significant associations for the United States and Australia, only two were significant, at an average r of .05. In Canada, only one association was found to be significant, also at an r of .05.
The availability of the 1990 World Values survey from the ICPSR enables the computation of a similar set of correlates for that data set.36 Forty-three countries were included in the 1990 World Values survey, yielding a possible maximum of 129 significant correlations among the three elements of the purported civic culture syndrome. In two countries (Switzerland and Romania), however, no data are reported for the opposition to revolutionary change item, leaving a total possible number of correlations of 127. Of those, only sixty-two, or 48.8 percent, were found to be significant at the .05 level or better, but thirteen of those were in the wrong direction. Only 38.6 percent were significant and in the right direction. Only in Spain, Norway, and Czechoslovakia were there significant associations among all three variables. Once again, there is little or no significant association among these items even in quintessentially democratic cases like Britain and Canada, where only one of the three correlates was significant (and the correlation coefficient was only .10). Furthermore, there seemed to be no discernible pattern whereby the syndrome is more likely to emerge in older democracies than in new ones. Thus, Inglehart's claim that the new democracies tend to "wash out" the expected association is not supported by this analysis. Latinobarometer also contains an item that seems to be ideal for testing respondents' commitment to democracy. "With which of the following statements do you agree the most? (1) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; (2) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one; or (3) For people like me, a democratic regime or an authoritarian regime makes no difference."37 This variable was coded so that those who prefer democracy over any other form of government were scored 100, those who prefer authoritarianism were scored 0, and those who were indifferent were scored 50. Table 3 shows that in only 35 percent of the countries in the region (six of the seventeen) is there a statistically significant relationship between interpersonal trust and a preference for democracy. In other words, in two-thirds of the Latin American countries there is no significant relationship between trust and a preference for democracy, and the relationships among those that are significant are very weak. More troubling, the mean trust scores (data not shown) show that in eight countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela) mean trust scores are higher among those who prefer authoritarian government than those who prefer democracy. In Peru the trust scores are nearly twice as high among those who prefer authoritarianism.
Inglehart also examines the role of Putnam's social capital, measured in terms of civil society participation as a key indicator of a democratic citizenry.38 Such an emphasis makes sense, of course, because participation lies at the heart of nearly all conceptions of democracy and has been the subject of extensive study with survey data.39 Moreover, by moving away from a focus on one attitude, trust, predicting another attitude, preference for democracy, Inglehart's analysis focuses directly on the attitudinal linkage to behavior. Yet an examination of the seventeen samples in the Latinobarometer reveals that in only five-Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador-is there a monotonic statistically significant (.05 or better) relationship between interpersonal trust and civil society participation.40 Only in Chile and El Salvador, 12 percent of the cases in mainland Latin America, does interpersonal trust significantly predict both support for democracy and community participation. In light of the strong claims made for the centrality of interpersonal trust in the revitalized civic culture thesis, the Latin American data come as a major disappointment. The first issue is to test the extent to which the three civic culture items form a syndrome of related attitudes. The most obvious way to conduct this test is to examine the interitem correlations among the variables for all six countries in the study. Life satisfaction is coded with a 4 for those "very satisfied," 3 for those "fairly satisfied," 2 for those "not very satisfied," and 1 for those "not at all satisfied."43 Unlike the World Values and Latinobarometer surveys, which used a dichotomized response pattern, interpersonal trust is coded similarly to the life satisfaction item, with a range from 4 points given to those who believe that most people are "very trustworthy" down to 1 point for those who believe that people are "not at all trustworthy."44 The support for revolutionary change variable, identical to Inglehart's item, had three options, a score of 3 for those who supported radical change, 2 for those who supported reforms, and 1 for those who opposed change.45
Micro-Level
As Table 4 Table 5 .
If high levels of life satisfaction and interpersonal trust are conducive to establishing and maintaining democratic institutions because they promote support for democratic political rights and civil liberties, there should be a negative relationship between these variables and support for repression of civil liberties. If strong support for revolutionary change is not conducive to democratic institutions because it inhibits support for democratic political rights and civil liberties, there should be a positive relationship between support for revolutionary change and support for repressive action. The results reveal that only seven of the eighteen coefficients on the civic culture variables are statistically significant, and of these seven six are in the wrong direction. Instead of the negative effect predicted by the civic culture theory, life satisfaction has a significant positive effect on support for repression of civil liberties in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and interpersonal trust has a positive effect on support for repressive action in Honduras. Moreover, a study based on a survey of political attitudes in the USSR before its breakup suggests that these findings from Central America might be generalizable. Among Soviet citizens, life satisfaction was negatively associated with support for political change toward democracy, a finding similar to the results from El Salvador and Nicaragua.48 And instead of the positive effect predicted by civic culture theory, support for revolutionary change has a significant negative effect on support for repressive action in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. Moreover, in every case except Honduras, support for revolutionary change is consistently negatively associated with support for repressive action, whereas Inglehart's thesis predicts the opposite. Only with regard to life satisfaction in Honduras does the sign of a significant coefficient conform to the expected relationship. Although the civic culture items did not fare well in predicting a key democratic value, education did better. In three of the six countries education has a significant negative effect on support for repression of civil liberties, a relationship in the expected direction. And even for the nonsignificant education effects the signs of the coefficients are correct. Thus, one of the components of the conventional socioeconomic status explanation of the development of democratic institutions is much more consistently supported in these empirical data than the civic culture argument.
Conclusions
Inglehart has hypothesized on the basis of system-level associations that a syndrome of attitudes that links interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and opposition to revolutionary change comprises the basis for a civic culture and is linked to democracy. However macro-level data measuring trust and democracy do not seem to fit most cases throughout the world, except for a small group of highly industrialized, advanced democracies in northern Europe and North America. The linear association between interpersonal trust and level of democracy disappears when a control is introduced for per capita income. At the micro level the expected association between the civic culture attitudes and preference for democracy did not emerge, either with the data on which Inglehart based his analyses or with data from Latin America, a world region not well covered in his data set. A more finely grained test using data from six Central American countries with similar histories and cultural traditions but widely differing levels of democracy revealed an almost complete absence of a civic culture syndrome and linkages to explicitly democratic values and behaviors. The findings of a regression analysis seeking linkages between the hypothesized civic culture syndrome and support/opposition to the suppression of civil liberties proved devastating to the thesis. Two-thirds of the eighteen tested relationships were insignificant, and nearly all of the significant relationships flowed in the wrong direction.
There 
